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Preserving Life 
Gerald Kelly, S.J. 
Professor of Moral Theology 
St. Mary's College 
St. Marys, Kansas 
Editor's note: Father Gerald K elly. S.J .. has covered the Catholic 
attitude regarding the ordinary means of preserving life and the extra-
ordinary measures necessary to prolong existence in the Medico-Moral-
Problems series of booklets published by The Catholic Hospital A s.<o-
ciation. These publications ace now in the process of complete revision 
and we have asked permission to print, in advance, the following a a 
combined article foe LINACRE QUARTERLY readers. Inquiries continue 
to reach us regarding these topics and a reprint will be prepared for 
distribution at the Federation Exhibit during the A .M .A . convention 
. this June. Questions pertinen_t to these subjects were the most fre-
quently asked during the session last year. 
THE ORDINARY MEANS OF 
PRESERVING LIFE 
Euthanasia usually implies the 
use of some positive means to end 
life: e.g., taking poison, a lethal 
dose of some drug. and so forth. 
But death can a lso be brought 
about in a negative way: i.e., by 
not taking or giving something 
which is necessary for sustaining 
life; and in some cases this failure 
to take or give what is necessary 
for preserving life is equivalently 
euthanasia. That is the general 
meaning of n. 22 of The Ethical 
and Religious Directives for Cath-
olic Hospitals published by The 
<;:atholic Hospital Association: 
"The failure to supply the ordi-
nary means of preserving life is 
equivalent to euthanasia." A com-
plete explanation of this directive 
calls for an explanation of ordinary 
and extraordinary means of pre-
serving life, as theologians use 
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these terms, and also for an ex-
planation of the duties of patients 
and doctors regarding the use of 
these means. 
MEANING OF TERMS 
Doctors and theologians are apt 
to attach different meanings to the 
terms, "ordinary'' and "extraordi-
nary," as J. E. Drew, M.D., and 
John C. Ford, S .J., pointed out in 
their article, "Advising Radical 
Surgery: A Problem in Medical 
Morality," Journal of the American 
M edical Association, Feb. 28, 1953, 
pp. 711-716. Thus, as regards 
physicians, Dr. Drew and Fr. Ford 
write: "To the physician ordinary 
signifies standard, recognized, or-
thodox, or established medicines or 
procedures of that time period. at 
that level of medical practice, and 
within the limits of availability. 
Extraordinary signifies, from the 
physician's standpoint. a medica-
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ment or procedure that might be 
fanciful. bizarre, experimental, in-
completely established, unortho-
dox, or not recognized ." 
Theologians use these terms in a 
different sense; and it is important 
to note this because the directive 
follows the theological meanin g. 
As regards various hospital proce-
dures. the theologian would say 
that ordinary means of preserving 
life are all medicines, treatments, 
and operations, which offer a rea-
sonable hope of benefit for the pa-
tient and which can be obta ined 
and used without excessive ex-
pense. pain, or other inconvenience. 
For example, suppose that a pa-
tient whose health is normally 
good has pneumonia. This patient 
is now facing a crisis ; but from our 
experience we have every reason 
to believe that we can bring him 
through the crisis by means of cer-
tain drugs. such as penicillin, and 
the use of oxygen for a time. Once 
he passed the crisis he would be 
well on the way to complete re-
covery. Here we seem clearly to 
be dealing with ordinary means; 
for the use of the drugs and oxy-
gen in these circumstances does 
not involve excessive inconveni-
ence; and there is a very reason-
able hope of success. 
In contradistinction to ordinary 
are extraordinary means of pre-
serving life. By these we mean all 
medicines, treatments, and opera-
tions, which cannot be obtained or 
used without excessive expense. 
pain, or other inconvenience, or 
Which, if used. would not offer a 
reasonable hope of benefit. For 
example, consider a case like this. 
A young woman has a rare cardiac 
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ailment. There is a chance of cur-
ing her with an extremelv delicate 
operation; but it is only ~ chance. 
Without the operation, she may 
die on the table or shortly after-
wards: but she also has a chance, 
though considerably less than an 
even chance, of surviving and of 
being at least comparatively cured. 
This operation seems to be a clear 
example of an extraordinary means 
of preserving life, especially be-
cause of the risk and uncertainty 
that it involves. 
Another example. A patient, al~ 
most 90 years of age. has a cardio-
renal disease and has been in a 
coma for two weeks, during w hich 
time he has received intravenous 
solution of glucose and some digi- . 
talis preparation. This coma is ap-
parently terminal. In such a case, 
is the continued use of glucose and 
digitalis to be considered an ordi-
nary or extraordinary means of 
preserving life? The answer may 
not be entirely clear and beyond 
debate; but I believe that moralists 
would generally say that. though 
the use of the glucose and digitalis 
would be ordinary means if it were 
merely a matter of tiding a patient 
over a temporary crisis, yet in the 
present case the actual benefit they 
confer on the patient is so slight 
in comparison with the continued 
cost and difficulty of hospitaliza-
tion and care that their use should 
be called an extraordinary means 
of preserving life. 
THE DUTY 
E very individual has the obliga-
tion to take the ordinary means of 
preserving his life. Deliberate neg-
lect of such means is tantamount 
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to suicide. Consequently. every 
patient has the duty to submit to 
any treatment which is clearly an 
ordinary means; and his doctor, as 
well as the nurses and hospital 
personnel, has the duty to use such 
means in treating the patient. To 
do less than this is equivalently 
euthanasia - as is stated in direc-
tive 22. 
It should be noted, however, that 
the di rective is here enunciating 
only a minimum: this is the least 
that must be done for any patient. 
As a matter of fact. there are some 
cases in which a p atient might be 
obliged to use extraordinary 
means; and there are many cases 
in which the doctor is obliged to 
use them. In the next section I 
shall try to indicate some norms 
for the use of extraordinary means 
in the care of patients. For the 
present. it seems sufficient merely 
to state the fact that the use of 
extraordinary means is sometimes 
obligatory. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
It is not always easy to distin-
guish between ordinary and extra-
ordinary means of preserving life. 
I believe that the definitions I have 
given would meet with substantial 
approval by most moralists today; 
yet some might prefer to phrase 
them somewhat differently. For in-
stance, one outstanding theologian 
·suggests that ordinary means 
would include "the medicines, 
nursing, etc., usually adopted by 
persons of the same condition of 
life as the patient." This is per-
haps a good working rule for most 
cases. I believe, h<;>wever, that it 
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should be considered as me rely 
supplementary to the defini tions I 
have given, because my definitions 
more explicitly include elements 
that are essential to the historical 
development of the terms. ordinary 
and extraordinary means of pre-
serving life. The medical profes-
sion should know something of this 
history. · 
The moralists w ho coined the 
terms , ordinary and extraord inary 
means of preserving life. w ere 
deeply conscious ( as Catholic mor-
alist have a lways been ) of a clear 
distinction between the d uty of 
avoiding evil and the duty of d oing 
good. One must. at all costs. avoid 
doing what is intrinsically evil; but 
there are reasonable and propor-
tionate limits to one's duty of do-
ing good. For example, the mar-
tyrs were not ordinarily obliged to 
seek out their persecutors in order 
to profess their faith before them; 
but when faced with the critical 
choice of either denying their faith 
or dying they w ere obliged to sub-
mit to death. The reason is that 
to deny one's faith in the one true 
God is intrinsically evil - some-
thing which may never be done. 
even to avoid torture and death. 
A modern exa mple illustrating the 
same matter might be the problem 
of childbearing in marriage. Mar-
ried people are not obliged to have 
all the children they possibly can. 
nor obliged to have children in the 
face of great inconveniences; but 
they are clearly obliged to avoid 
contraception because it is intrin-
sically evil. 
With this distinction between 
doing good and avoiding evil in 
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mind, the old moralists approached 
the problem of preserving life. 
They were not disturbed by the 
problem of "mercy killing"; they 
know that ·suicide and murder are 
always wrong and that no incon-
veniences can justify them. But to 
preserve one's life is to do good: 
and the duty of doing good is usu-
ally circumscribed by certain limits. 
The moralists set out to make a 
prudent estimate of the limits of 
this duty. In other words, they 
wanted to answer the simple ques-
tion that any good man might ask: 
"How much does God demand 
that I do in order to preserve this 
life which belongs to God and of 
which I am only a steward?" In 
answering this question, they dis-
cussed such practical. concrete 
things as expense. pain, repug-
nance, and other inconveniences. 
. I NCONVENIENCE 
For example, regarding expense. 
they considered it obvious that a 
man would have to go to some ex-
pense in caring for his health. Yet 
he need not spend money or incur 
a debt which would impose a very 
great hardship on himself or his 
family, because this kind of hard-
ip would be more than a " rea-
nable" or "moderate" care of 
Ith and therefore more than 
God would ordinarily demand. 
And· so of other things . The 
moralists spoke of great pain. e.g .. 
e enduring of a serious operation 
days when there were no effec-
tive anaesthetics. It took heroism 
lo undergo such an ordeal; and the 
moralists prudently estimated that 
individual would not ordin arily 
obliged to submit to it. They 
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spoke of other inconveniences, too : 
e.g .. of moving to another climate 
or another country to preserve 
one's life. For people whose lives 
were, so to speak, · rooted in the 
land, and who e native town or 
village was as dear as life itself. 
and for whom, moreover, travel 
was always difficult and often dan-
gerous - for such people. moving 
to a nother country or climate was 
a truly great hardship. and more 
than God would demand as a "rea-
sonable" means of preserving one's 
health and life. 
The foregoing are merely ex-
am pies of the way the older mor-
a lists considered the means of pre-
serving life in terms of inconveni-
ence. If the inconvenience involved 
in preserving life was excessive by 
reason of expense, pain, or other 
hardship to oneself or others. then 
this particular means of preserving 
life was called extraordinary. On 
the other hand , when no excessive· 
inconvenience was involved, ·the 
means of preserving life would 
generally be considered ordinary. 
U SEFULNESS 
There is one more point to be 
discussed before I can give a com-
plete idea of the historical notions 
of ordinary and extraordinary. I 
can illustrate this point by an ex-
ample taken from another section 
of moral theology: the duty of 
charity towards one's neighbor. 
Suppose that I see my neighbor 
drowning. but that I am a very 
poor swimmer and should have 
very little chance of saving him. 
Am I obliged to make the attempt? 
Catholic moralists would say that I 
might be heroic to try. but that I 
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would have no strict obligation to 
do so. In giving s uch an answer, 
they are simply applying a sound 
principle of both philosophy and 
common sense, namely. that no one 
is obliged to do w11a t is practically 
useless. 
Moralists have applied this same 
principle when discussing the duty 
of preserving one's own life, espe-
cially by taking medicines, under-
going operations, and so forth. As 
a matter of fact, we know that 
some of these things help. and 
some do not; some offer great hope 
of s uccess; others offer very slight 
hope. The old moralists realized 
this too; and they introduced this 
element of "hope of success" into 
their concepts of ordinary and ex-
traordinary means of preserving 
life. A means was considered ex-
traordinary if it involved excessive 
inconvenience or if it offered no 
reasonable hope of benefit. A 
means was considered ordinary if 
it did not involve excessive incon-
venience and it offered a reason-
able hope of benefit. 
The foregoing are the main 
points that mark the development 
of the moralists' discussion of ordi-
nary and extraordinary means of 
preserving life. We can apply 
them to the vast number of arti-
ficial life-sustainers now at the dis-
posal of the medical profession by 
judging two elements, convenience 
.and utility. A medicine, treatment, 
etc., is to be considered an ordi-
nary means if it can be obtained 
and used with relative conveni-
ence and if it offers reasonable 
hope of benefit. When either of 
these conditions is lacking. the 
means is extraordinary. 
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It should also be noted that the 
moralists were primarily concerned 
with the duty of the individual 
( i.e., the patient) , not his doctor. 
They thus chose the easier course, 
because the doctor's problem is 
much more complicated. The pa-
tient is obliged to use ordmary 
means; as for extraordinary means. 
he may use them if he wishes. but, 
apart from very special circum-
stances. he is not obliged to do so. 
I have heard it said that the doc-
tor's duty is exactly the same as 
the patient's. This is not correct. 
The doctor ( as well as nurses and 
hospital authorities and personnel) 
must do not only what the patient 
is obliged to do but also what the 
patient reasonably wants and what 
the recognized standards of the 
medical profession r equire. I shall 
discuss these points in the next 
section. 
It is important to nqte that. 
though the notions of ordinary and 
extraordinary remain the same. 
their applications can vary with 
changing circumstances. For ex• 
ample. major operations used to 
be considered extraordinary means 
of preserving life on two counts: 
first. because the pain was practk• 
ally unbearable for most people; 
and secondly. because the outcome 
was often very uncertain, e.g .. be· 
cause of the danger of infection . 
Today we have means of controll• 
ing both the pain and the danger 
of infection; hence, many opera· 
tions that would have been eXtra• 
ordinary in former times have now 
become ordinary means of preserv• 
ing life. 
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EXTRAORDINARY MEANS OF 
PROLONGING LIFE 
In the preceding section it was 
pointed out that, in terms of mod-
ern medical procedures, extraordi-
nary means of preserving l:fc are 
all medicines, treatments, ,mJ op-
erations, which cannot be o'.Jtained 
or used without excessive ,:xpense. 
pain, or other inconvenieP.•:~ for the 
patient or for others. or wf.ich. if 
used, would not offer a reasonable 
hope of benefit to the patient. One 
example given was that of a very 
dangerous and uncert.iin opera tion ; 
another was the use of such things 
as intravenous feeding to prolong 
life in a terminal coma. StiJI a n-
other example. culled from medi-
cal literature, is the case "when life 
can be somewhat prolonged by a 
gastroenterostomy or an entero-
anastomosis," as mentioned by 
Walter C. Alvar~z. M.D .. in the 
Journal of the American Medical 
Association, Septemher I.I. 1952. 
p. 91. 
In concrete cases it is not a lways 
easy to determine when a given 
frocedure is an extraor ,Jinary 
means. It is not computed accord-
Ing to a mathematical f•·rmula. but 
according to the reason .. ~le judg-
ent of prudent and cor.scientious 
en. Granted such ,, judgment, 
e patient himself is not generally 
Clbliged to use or to submit to the 
procedure. He may. with a good 
conscience, ref-tse it except in spe-
, I cases when a prcolongation of 
s life is necessary: (a) for the 
common good, as mif,ht happen in 
he case of a great soldier or states-
n; and ( b) for his own eternal 
•elfare, a s might b£ the case when 
e has not yet had the opportunity 
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of receivtng the Last Sacraments. 
Here I want to consider the duty 
of the doctor to use extraordinary 
means of preserving )jfe. Under 
the term " doc or," I include not 
only the attencling physician but 
a lso all who assist him in the care 
of the patient, i.e., nurses and hos-
pital personnel. To avoid unneces-
sary complications we shall limit 
the discussion to patients who are 
in some sense "paying" patients, 
i.e .. those whose expenses are be-
ing paid by themselves, their rela- . 
tives. an insurance company. etc. 
In other words. we are excluding 
the purely charity case in which 
the medical care is given gratis. 
THE PATIENT'S WISH 
How is the doctor to judge 
whether he is obliged to use an 
extraordinary means? The first 
rule for judging is indicated by Dr. 
Alvarez when he speab of some-. 
wh;,t prolonging life by a gastro-
enterostomy or an enteroanastomo-
sis : "the wishes of the patient 
should be ascertained." The words 
I have italicized contain the first 
rule concerning the doctor's duty : 
he must do what the patient wishes. 
It is the patient who has the right 
to use or to refuse the extraordi-
nary means; hence, it is primarily 
the patient who must be consulted. 
Obviously there are many cases in 
which it is impossible tQ consult 
the patient, e.g., when he is deliri-
ous or in a coma, or when he is a 
small child. In these cases the right 
to make the decision is vested in 
those who are closest to the pa-
tient, i.e .. husband. wife, parents. 
guardians. Thus, Dr. Alvarez 
rightly says that the wishes of the 
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family must be consul)ed when 
there is question of effor(s at resus-
citation by means of oxygen and 
"endless injections of stimulants" 
in the case of an old person who is 
close to death. I might add here 
that the rela tives · do not make this 
decision precisely in their own 
name, but rather as representing 
the patient; hence, they should try 
to determine what he would rea-
sonably want done under the cir-
cu mstances. ( Perhaps some fur-
ther distinction should be made re-
garding relatives and guardians 
who merely a dminister the proper-
ty of the sick man and those who 
pay his medical bills out of their 
own money; but I believe su.ch a 
distinction is not pertinent to our 
present discussion. ) 
There are cases, no doubt, when 
consultation with the patient or the 
relatives \vould be impossible. or 
inadvisable, or useless: e.g., when 
they would not understand the is-
sues or are too much distraught to 
make decisions, and so forth. In 
such cases, it seems to me, the doc-
tor should follow the plan previ-
ously suggested for the relatives: 
that is, try to make a prudent esti-
mate of what the patient would 
reasonably want if he could be 
asked. This would mean that the 
doctor would do what he sincerely 
judged to be for the best interests 
of his patient. If other means are 
lacking for determining this, the 
·golden rule should be helpful. 
What would the doctor himself 
want if he were in the patient's 
condition? 
ship; and what has been said may 
be reduced to this: the doctor 
should follow the expressed w ishes 
of the patient or his representa-
. tives; and when their wishes can-
not be explicitly ascertained, he 
should do what he thinks the pa-
tient would want or what he sin-
cerely judges to be for the ·patient's 
best interests. Even these rela tive-
ly simple rules are sometimes d iffi-
cult to apply; but the problem of 
using or not using ·extraordinary 
means may be even further com-
plicated by the question of " pro-
fessional standards." 
When I speak of professional 
standards, I mean this: is there 
a line of conduct dictated by his 
profession itself which requires the 
doctor to take means of prolonging 
life that might not be required 
merely by the physician-patient re-
lationship? To make this problem 
more concrete, let me say that in 
discussions with conscientious phy-
sicians I have observed two differ-
ent professional standards in this 
matter. 
One group of these conscienti-
ous physicians believes that the 
doctor's duty is to preserve life as 
long as he can, by any means at 
his disposal, and no matter how 
hopeless the case seems to be. We 
can call this the strict, or extreme, 
professional standard. The doctors 
who uphold this standard admit 
the right of the patient or his rep_-
resentatives to refuse extraordi-
nary means; but they think that. 
insofar as the judgment is left to 
the doctor himself. he must simply 
STRICT PROFESSIONAL STANDARD keep trying to prolong life right 
Thus far we have considered to the very end. 
only the doctor-patient relation- The fo1lowing of this strict 
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standard has several advantages. 
In the first place, it gives euthan-
asia the widest berth possible. Sec-
ondly, it completely avoids defeat-
ism. These doctors not only keep 
trying to conquer a disease. they 
also keep trying to save the indi-
vidual patient. And there is no 
doubt about it: they can some-
times show us cases in which a 
former patient is now alive and 
well two, three, or many years af-
ter he was supposed to be "hope-
less." Finally, strict though it is, 
this standard is easiest on the doc-
tor's own conscience because he is 
never forced to make the painful 
decision to cease using intravenous 
feeding, oxygen, and so forth , in 
the case of a dying patient. 
IVIODERATE STANDARD 
As I said, there are many con-
scientious doctors w ho follow the 
strict standard to which reference 
has just been made. But there are 
others, equa1ly conscientious, w ho 
believe that a more moderate 
standard should be followed. These 
~octors try to effect a cure as long 
ls there is any reasonable hope of 
doing so; they try to preserve life 
as long as the patient himself can 
ap any tangible benefits from the 
olongation. But they also think 
ere is a point when such efforts 
come futile gestures; and they 
lieve · that at this point the sole 
uty of the doctor is to see that 
e patient gets good nursing care 
d that his pain is alleviated. 
The advantages of the strict 
ndard are the disadvantages of 
e moderate standard. The doe-
rs who follow this latter standard 
ainly have no sympathy for 
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euthanasi ; yet their failure to take 
certain means of prolonging life 
might at times create the impres-
sion of favoring euthanasia. They 
are not defeatists ; yet, through 
their willingness to consider some 
cases hopeless according to present 
medical knowledge, they might oc-
casiona1ly lose a battle that the 
stricter doctors would win. lVIore-
over , their occasional decisions to 
discontinue stimulants or artificial 
feeding are seldom ma de with per-
fect mental peace. Such a decision . 
easily generates worry. 
But it must be admitted that the 
moderate standard is not without 
its advantages. For one thing, it 
seems to be very much in accord 
with the traditional policy of Cath-
olic theologians of interpreting ob-
ligations according to a reasonable 
limit - as we have seen, for ex-
ample, in their explanation of the 
individual's duty of caring for his . 
own health. 
The moderate s tandard also 
seems to square with a good Chris-
tian a ttitude. I once asked the 
mother superior of a home for in-
curable cancer patients whether 
they used such things as intraven-
ous feeding to prolong life. She re-
plied that they did not. They gave 
a ll patients devoted nursing care; 
they tried to a 1leviate pain; and 
they helped the patients to make 
the best possible spiritual prepara-
tion for death. lVIany very good 
people w ith whom I have spoken 
about this matter think these sisters 
have the right idea - "the good 
Christian attitude toward life and 
death," as they ca11 it. This is 
really an exemplification of the 
moderate standard. 
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Finally, it seems evide that the 
moderate standard is Jess likely to 
impose excessive burdens on the 
patient's relatives. Relatives often 
endure terrific strain and undergo 
great expense w hile life is being 
prolonged by arti ficial means; and 
in some cases - e.g., the termina l 
coma - very little good seems to 
be accomplished. The moderate 
standard spares them some of this 
strain and expense. 
CONCLUSION 
have dwelt at some length on 
these two views of conscientious 
physicians because I wanted to 
make it clear that as yet there is 
no clear-cut professional standard 
regarding what I might respect-
fully call "the fine points" of care 
of the dying. I may add that 
among moral theologians a some-
w hat similar condition prevails: 
up to a certain point duties are 
clear and there is agreement on 
w hat must be done; beyond that 
point the rules of obligation be-
come obscure a nd there is room 
for differences of opinion. 
Some time ago, I published in 
the Jesuit quarterly. Theological 
Studies (June 1950, pp. 203-220). 
a rather lengthy article entitled 
" The Duty of Using Artificial 
Means of Preserving Life." The 
purpose of this article was to stim-
ulate discussion among theologians 
. concerning what seemed to be a 
cardinal problem in modern medi-
cal practice. Later, in the same 
magazine ( December, 1951, pp. 
550-556), I published a shorter 
article entitled "The Duty to Pre-
ser ve Life," which included the 
points that had been brought out 
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in our discussions. This second 1r-
ticle conclu·ded w ith a statement 
which substantially expresses the 
minds of many competent theo-
logians. Perhaps it will help to re-
print it here. It runs as follows . 
I. It is not contrary to the comrnon 
good for a doctor to admit that a patient 
is incurable and to cease trying to effect 
a cure. But it would be contrary to the 
common good to cease trying to fi nd a 
remedy for the disease itself. 
2. As long as there is even a slight 
hope of curing a patient or checking the 
progress of his illness, the doctor should 
use ever_y probable remedy at his com-
mand. The common good demands this 
rule of conduct for the doctor; and it 
should be followed as long as the patient 
makes no objection. The patient, how· 
ever, is entitled to refuse any trea tment 
that would be extraordinary. 
3. When a doctor and his consultdnl5 
have sincerely judged that '! patient is 
incurable, the decision concerning further 
treatment should be in terms of the pa-
tient's own interests and reasonable wishes, 
expressed or implied. Proper treatment 
certainly includes the use of all natural 
means of preserving life (food, drink, 
etc.) , good nursing care, appropriate meas-
ures to relieve physical and mental pain, 
and the opportunity of preparing for 
death. Since the professional standards 
of conscientious physicians vary some.-
what regarding the use of further means, 
such as artificial life-sustainers, the doctor 
should feel free in conscience to use or 
not use these things, according to the 
circumstances of each. case. In general. it 
may be said that he has no moral obliga· 
tion to use them unless they offer the hope 
of some real benefit to his patient without 
imposing a disproportionate inconvenience 
on others, or unless, by reason of special 
conditions, failure to use such means 
would refiect unfavorably on his pro-
fession. 
All of us who sponsored this 
statement realize that it may need 
improvement and further clarifica· 
tion. Even as it stands, however, 
it should help doctors to solve 
these difficult cases with a realiza-
tion of a certain degree of liberty 
of judgment and with a consequent 
peace of conscience. 
LINACRE QUARTERLY 
't)oettPt, I , , , 
Edward D. Roche, C.M. 
C haplain 
De Paul Hosp ita l, St. Louis, Mo. 
THE VERBAL switch in the title is not a little trick made 
just to be facetious. It states a 
real problem which needs a realis-
tic solution. I am hoping by the 
title not only to catch your eye, but 
also to hold your mind and en-
courage you to look into your con-
science. 
The traditional call for a doctor 
indicates a need; a need at once 
urgent and immediate, demanding 
the special care of a medical ma n. 
Here, too, is a call also indicating 
a need - a need which is also 
pressing. demanding the special 
care of a dedicated man. This is 
the doctor's own family calling ... 
calling him to come home, because 
of the desperate need of a hus-
band and a father, It can be a 
very pitifu_l. sometimes tragic, plea 
- "We need a father in the 
house!" 
This is not a simple problem for 
which there is any easy solution. 
This is not a question of "close 
the shop and go on home," or 
"don't delay in the tavern after 
Work," or "cut down on the busi-
ness trips and stop entertaining 
the clients at night." Nor am I 
c~ncerned with the type of man 
who could, but just doesn't want 
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to be home, one who is looking for 
excuses to stay away. I am talk-
ing about a man who is good, hon-
est and sincere, one who loves his 
wife and children and wants to be 
with them. He feels the lack of 
time he has with them as keenly 
as they do. But he is a doctor and 
he just can't seem to get home be-
cause there are too many other 
people consuming his time. 
Obviously, then, the doctor is 
faced with a basic conflict of obli-
gations. This is not just an ap-
parent conflict. It is real. because 
the two-fold obligation of the doc-
tor is serious a nd binding in con-
science. He has an obligation to 
his family which he assumed free-
ly and willingly when he received 
the sacrament of matrimony. More -
than just providing food , clothing 
and education, he owes himself as 
the head of the house, giving love 
and affection and assistance to his 
wife in caring for and training the 
children. H e cannot do this and 
be absent from them the greater 
part of the time. 
H e also has an obligation by 
reason of his profession to his pa-
tients. He is a doctor, again, be-
cause he freely and willingly chose 
a medical career. When he be-
ll 
